We consider the following decision-making scenario: a society of voters has to find an agreement on a set of proposals, and every single proposal is to be accepted or rejected. Each voter supports a certain subset of the proposals-the favorite ballot of this voter-and opposes the remaining ones. He accepts a ballot if he supports more than half of the proposals in this ballot. The task is to decide whether there exists a ballot approving a specified number of selected proposals (agenda) such that all voters (or a strict majority of them) accept this ballot.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following decision-making scenario that may occur in contexts like coalition formation, the design of party platforms, the change of statutes of an association, or the agreement on contract issues: A leader has an agenda, that is, a set of proposals she wants to get realized. However, a set of proposals has to be approved or disapproved as a whole by a set of voters. Each voter has his favorite proposals he wants to support. A set of proposals is acceptable to a voter if he supports more than half of these proposals. Now, the leader might have a hidden agenda, that is, she is searching for a set of proposals containing at least some of her favorite proposals such that a majority of voters accepts this set. Can the leader efficiently find such a successful set of proposals satisfying her agenda? What changes when this set of proposals has to be acceptable to all voters and not just to a majority?
Mathematical Model
Let V be a society of n voters and P be a set of m proposals. Each voter may support any number of proposals in P and rejects all the others. Subsets of P are called ballots. The favorite ballot B i ⊆ P of a voter i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) consists of all proposals he supports.
The voters evaluate a ballot Q ⊆ P according to the size of the intersection of Q and their favorite ballots. More precisely, voter i accepts Q if and only if a strict majority of proposals from Q is also contained in his favorite ballot, that is,
We say that in this case voter i is happy with Q.
The central question is whether there exists a ballot Q that (a) satisfies a hidden agenda and that (b) is acceptable to the society. The agenda is encoded by the agenda set Q + ⊆ P and by a lower bound q + on the number of agenda proposals that are to be contained in Q. The society's acceptance in (b) might be a unanimous acceptance or a majority acceptance. This leads to the following two problems, which only differ in the respective questions asked.
UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BALLOT (UNAAB)
Input: A set P of m proposals; a society V of n voters with favorite ballots B 1 , . . . , B n ⊆ P; an agenda (Q + , q + ), Q + ⊆ P, and q + ∈ N. Question: Is there a ballot Q ⊆ P with |Q + ∩ Q| ≥ q + that every single voter i accepts (that is, |B i ∩ Q| > |Q|/2)?
MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT (MAJAB)
Input: A set P of m proposals; a society V of n voters with favorite ballots B 1 , . . . , B n ⊆ P; an agenda (Q + , q + ), Q + ⊆ P, and q + ∈ N. Question: Is there a ballot Q ⊆ P with |Q + ∩ Q| ≥ q + that a strict majority of the voters accepts (that is, |B i ∩ Q| > |Q|/2)?
Sometimes we only use the term agenda (without "hidden"), although we always assume the agenda to be unknown for the voters. One important special case of UNAAB or MAJAB is when there is no agenda, that is, Q + = ∅ or q + = 0. In this case, the only question is whether there is a ballot acceptable to the society. For the rest of the article, we assume without loss of generality that q + = 0 if and only if Q + = ∅. There is one column for each proposal from P and one row for each favorite ballot of a voter. There is a "+" in row i and column j if and only if p j ∈ B i ; otherwise, there is a "−". We use this way of illustrating subset families several times in this article. Here, we highlight the only two unanimously accepted ballots from Example 1 (left: { p 1 , p 2 , p 3 }; right: { p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 }).
The following example demonstrates that the solution sizes to our problems are not monotone, that is, a solution ballot of size h does not imply a solution of a size smaller or larger than h. This is in notable contrast to many natural decision problems, such as all problems we reduce from in this article.
Example 1. Consider the society V = {1, 2, 3, 4} of voters and the set P = { p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 } of proposals. The favorite ballots are given as B 1 = {p 1 , p 2 , p 4 }, B 2 = {p 1 , p 2 , p 5 }, B 3 = {p 1 , p 3 , p 5 }, and B 4 = {p 2 , p 3 , p 4 }.
Suppose that there is no agenda. Then the only unanimously accepted ballots are { p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } of size three and { p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 } of size five (see also Figure 1 ). This shows that the set of sizes of all solution ballots may contain gaps.
With regard to majority acceptance, if the hidden agenda is ({ p 4 , p 5 }, 2), then the ballots { p 1 , p 4 , p 5 }, { p 2 , p 4 , p 5 }, and { p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , p 4 , p 5 } are the only ballots that are acceptable to a strict majority of voters (the first ballot is accepted by the voters 1-3, the second ballot is accepted by the voters 1, 2, and 4, and the third ballot is accepted by all voters). Again, the set of sizes of all solution ballots contains gaps.
Related Work
Our model can be seen as a special case of an approval voting system with threshold functions as introduced by Fishburn and Pekeč [2004] . In this model, the profile also consists of a set P of m proposals and a society V of n voters with favorite ballots B 1 , . . . , B n ⊆ P. Additionally, one specifies the set ζ of admissible committees, which is a family of subsets of P without the empty set. The winners are defined by the choice function, which maps each profile to a nonempty subfamily of ζ . The choice function C t for some threshold function t : ζ → R + (with R + being the set of positive rational numbers) is defined by Q ∈ C t ↔ Q ∈ ζ ∧ ∀Q ∈ ζ : |{i : B i ∩ Q ≥ t(Q)}| ≥ |{i : B i ∩ Q ≥ t(Q )}|. Now, setting the admissible committees ζ to all subsets of P without the empty set and defining the strict majority threshold function SMT by SMT(Q) := |Q|+1 2 , the choice function C SMT can be read as follows: A ballot Q represents a voter if and only if a strict majority of the proposals from Q are supported by the voter. The choice function C SMT selects the ballots that represent the most voters [Kilgour and Marshall 2012] . In our model, we ask whether there is a ballot that represents all (a strict majority, respectively, of the) voters and that contains q + proposals from Q + . Except for t being the constant 1-function where NP-hardness for computing the choice function is known [Fishburn and Pekeč 2004] , no computational complexity analysis has been undertaken for C SMT [Fishburn and Pekeč 2004; Kilgour 2010; Kilgour and Marshall 2012] .
The scenario considered in our work is also related to the concepts of collective domination [Elkind et al. 2011] , approval-based multiwinner rules [Aziz et al. 2014; Kilgour 2010; Kilgour and Marshall 2012] , and proportional representation in multiwinner elections [Betzler et al. 2013; Chamberlin and Courant 1983; Lu and Boutilier 2011; Monroe 1995; Potthoff and Brams 1998; Procaccia et al. 2008; Skowron et al. 2013a] as well as in resource allocation [Skowron et al. 2013b [Skowron et al. , 2015 -in all cases one has to select certain alternatives (proposals in our context) that provide a "good representation" of the voters' will. In our work, we deal with "collectively winning ballots," namely, more than half of the proposals in such a ballot are supported by a voter. The literature contains many different concepts for "good representations" of the voters' will in the literature that are designed for different application scenarios. The approval-based multiwinner rule Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV), introduced by Kilgour [2010] , has a similar flavor as our model since it also aims to maximize the voters' satisfaction with the selected committee. However, in SAV the committee size is fixed, the satisfaction is measured by "the number of selected favorites divided by the total number of the voter's favorites" (instead of "the number of selected favorites divided by the total number of selected alternatives" as in our model) and the optimization criterion is utilitarian (instead of egalitarian as in our model). In contrast to our model, winner determination for SAV is polynomial-time solvable. Similarly to our unanimous model variant, where each voter must be satisfied, proportional representation aims to assign to each voter a good representative, but the votes are usually based on linear preferences or utility functions.
Further related models have been considered in the theory and practice of decision making. For instance, Laffond and Lainé [2012] recently investigated the conditions under which issue-wise majority voting allows for reaching several types of compromise. An alternative to issue-wise evaluation is to compare issue sets (which correspond to ballots in our setting) using the symmetric difference from a voter's favorite issue set [Ç uhadaroglu and Lainé 2012; Lainé 2009, 2012] . A small symmetric difference is good, and a large symmetric difference is bad. This way of comparing issue sets is very close to our model: A voter accepts a ballot Q if and only if the symmetric difference from his favorite ballot B to Q is smaller than the symmetric difference from B to the empty ballot. Typically, the studies in this context use issue sets to analyze properties or paradoxes of an issue-wise voting process and do not provide computational complexity results.
Computational complexity studies are established for related decision-making problems like judgment aggregation [Baumeister et al. 2011; Endriss et al. 2012] , approvalbased multiwinner determination [Aziz et al. 2014] , lobbying [Bredereck et al. 2014b; Christian et al. 2007; Binkele-Raible et al. 2014; Erdélyi et al. 2007] , proportional representation in multiwinner elections [Potthoff and Brams 1998; Procaccia et al. 2008; Lu and Boutilier 2011; Betzler et al. 2013; Skowron et al. 2013a ] as well as in resource allocation [Skowron et al. 2013b [Skowron et al. , 2015 , or control of multiple referenda [Conitzer et al. 2009 ]. In the context of judgment aggregation, Alon et al. [2013b] investigated the computational complexity of control by bundling issues, which is also related to "vote on bundled proposals" as considered in our article. Baumeister et al. [2013] investigated the computational complexity of control by bundling judges.
Finally, we mention in passing that central computational complexity results of our work are cast within the framework of parameterized complexity analysis, which due to its refined view on algorithmic (in)tractability fits particularly well with voting and related problems [Betzler et al. 2012; Bredereck et al. 2014a ]. NP-complete already for b gap = 1 (Thm. 2.9) The entry "ILP-FPT" means fixed-parameter tractability based on a formulation as an integer linear program. Note that all our "intractability" results except for the W[1]-completeness result for MAJAB parameterized by b max also hold for the case without hidden agenda.
Our Contributions
We analyze the combinatorial and algorithmic behavior of UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BAL-LOT and MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT. In particular, we investigate the role of the following natural parameters:
-the size |Q + | of the agenda set, -the number m of proposals, -the number n of voters, -the size h of the solution ballot Q, that is, h = |Q|, -the maximum size b max of favorite ballots, that is, b max = max i∈V |B i |, and -the difference b gap between (m+ 1)/2 and the minimum size of favorite ballots, that is,
The parameter b gap measures how far a given instance is from being trivial in terms of the number of proposals: If each voter's favorite ballot contains at least (m + 1)/2 proposals, then choosing Q = P makes every voter happy, so the instance is a trivial yes-instance. While the parameters n and m are naturally related to the "dimensions" of the input, the parameters h, b max , and b gap measure certain degrees of contradiction or inhomogeneity in an instance. The parameter |Q + | measures the size of the agenda set and is an upper bound for q + (in nontrivial instances). Section 2 is devoted to computational complexity results. The main picture is summarized in Table I . Not too much of a surprise, UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BALLOT and MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT turn out to be NP-complete. More surprisingly, this remains so even when the input ballots are almost trivial, that is, b gap = 1. Namely, if |B i | ≥ m/2 + 1 for all voters i, then all voters accept the ballot P. But if every voter i only satisfies the slightly weaker condition |B i | ≥ m/2 , then both problems already become NP-complete. Next, formulating the problems as Integer Linear programs (ILPs) where the number of variables only depends (exponentially) on n implies fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the parameter n. Using simple brute-force search, one easily obtains that both problems are fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the parameter m. As to efficient and effective preprocessing by polynomial-time data reduction, however, we show that neither for parameter n nor for parameter m polynomial-size problem kernels exist unless an unlikely collapse in complexity theory occurs. As to the parameter h, we prove parameterized intractability-more precisely, In Section 3, we provide an in-depth combinatorial analysis concerning the dependence of the size of a minimal solution ballot on the parameter n. In particular, we show the upper bound (n + 1) (n+1)/2 and the lower bound n n/2−o(n) for UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BALLOT without hidden agenda, thus achieving asymptotically almost matching bounds. Analogous results hold for MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT without hidden agenda. In Section 4, we conclude with some open questions for future research.
Parameterized Complexity Preliminaries
The concept of parameterized complexity was pioneered by Downey and Fellows [2013] (see also further textbooks [Flum and Grohe 2006; Niedermeier 2006] 
where f is an arbitrary computable function depending only on k. Correspondingly, FPT denotes the class of all fixed-parameter tractable parameterized problems. A core tool in the development of fixed-parameter algorithms is polynomial-time preprocessing by data reduction Kratsch 2014] . Here, the goal is to transform a given problem instance (x, k) in polynomial time into an equivalent instance (x , k ) with parameter k ≤ k such that the size of (x , k ) is upper bounded by some function g only depending on k. If this is the case, we call instance (x , k ) a (problem) kernel of size g (k) . If g is a polynomial, then we say that this problem has a polynomial-size problem kernel, in short, polynomial kernel.
Fixed-parameter intractability under some plausible complexity-theoretic assumptions can be shown by means of parameterized reductions. A parameterized reduction from a parameterized problem P to another parameterized problem P is a function that, given an instance (x, k), computes in f (k) · |x| O(1) time an instance (x , k ) (with k only depending on k) such that (x, k) is a yes-instance for P if and only if (x , k ) is a yes-instance for P . The two basic complexity classes for fixed-parameter intractability are W 
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY RESULTS
The following observation is used many times in our proofs. OBSERVATION 1. Let i and j be two voters that are both happy with some Q ⊆ P.
Since i is happy with Q it holds that |B i ∩ Q| > |Q|/2 and thus |Q \ B i | < |Q|/2. As B j ∩ Q ⊆ Q \ B i , voter j cannot be happy; a contradiction.
(ii) First, assume B i ∩ B j = {p} and p / ∈ Q. Then, two voters with the favorite ballots B i \ { p} and B j \ { p} would be happy with Q, but (B i \ { p}) ∩ (B j \ { p}) = ∅; a contradiction to (i). Second, assume B i ∩ B j = {p}, p ∈ Q, and without loss of generality |B i ∩ Q| > |B j ∩ Q|. Since voter i is happy with Q it holds that |B i ∩ Q| ≥ |Q|/2+1. Then, Q contains at least |Q|/2 proposals that are not p and thus not in B j ; a contradiction to the fact that voter j is happy.
The next observation basically says that UNAAB can be many-one reduced in polynomial time to MAJAB with the same agenda. This implies that the "majority problem" is computationally at least as hard as the "unanimous problem. PROOF. For the "only if " part, assume there is a ballot Q with |Q + ∩ Q| ≥ q + and Q is accepted by all n voters from I una . Then, the first n voters from I maj also accept Q and I maj has altogether 2n − 1 voters. For the "if " part, observe that only the first n voters from I maj can be happy with any ballot Q, because the remaining voters do not support any proposal. Hence, every Q that is accepted by a majority of voters from I maj is accepted by all voters from I una .
We will use the NP-complete HITTING SET problem [Garey and Johnson 1979] to prove many of our intractability results. Given a finite set U , subsets S 1 , . . . , S r of U, and a nonnegative integer k, HITTING SET asks whether there is a hitting set of size k, that is, whether there is a size-k set U ⊆ U such that S i ∩ U = ∅, i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. The following reduction from HITTING SET to UNAAB is used several times in our intractability proofs. Note that, due to Observation 2, it implies a reduction to MAJAB. PROOF. The instance constructed in Reduction 1 has m = |U | + k + 1 proposals and n = r + 2 voters. We will see in the following that the size h of the solution ballot Q is 2k+ 1. The reduction runs in O(|U | · r) time. Since Q + = ∅, any ballot that makes every voter happy is a solution. Thus, it remains to show that (U , S 1 , . . . , S r , k) has a hitting set of size k if and only if there is a ballot Q ⊆ P with |Q| ≤ 2k + 1 that makes every voter happy.
For the "only if " part, let H be a hitting set of size k, and let Q contain the k dummy proposals, the special proposal α, and the proposals in H. Then |Q| = 2k + 1, and it is easily seen that |B i ∩ Q| ≥ k + 1 holds for all voters i.
For the "if " part, by applying Observation 1(ii) to B r+1 and B r+2 , ballot Q contains the special proposal α and furthermore, Q contains the same number x of proposals from U as from the dummy proposals. Then x ≤ k, as there are only k dummy proposals. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the intersection Q∩ B i must contain at least one proposal from S i and hence, Q ∩ S i = ∅. Hence, the x ≤ k elements in Q ∩ U form a hitting set.
NP-Completeness
We show that UNAAB and MAJAB are NP-complete even without hidden agenda. This implies that there is no hope for fixed-parameter tractability when parameterizing by |Q + | or q + . THEOREM 2.1. Both UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BALLOT and MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT are NP-complete even without hidden agenda.
PROOF. Both problems are in NP: Checking whether a strict majority of voters or all voters are happy with a given proposal set Q such that |Q + ∩ Q| ≥ q + takes polynomial time. For the hardness proof, due to Observation 2, it is sufficient to show that UNAAB is NP-hard even without hidden agenda. This is achieved due to Lemma 1 and the fact that Reduction 1 is also a polynomial-time many-one reduction.
Few Proposals or Few Voters
Complementing our intractability result from Theorem 2.1, we show that instances with few proposals or few voters are tractable. More precisely, we show fixed-parameter tractability, that is, the considered problems are polynomial-time solvable for a fixed number of proposals or a fixed number of voters and the degree of the polynomial is a constant. However, we also show that under plausible complexity-theoretic assumptions these problems do not admit polynomial-time preprocessing algorithms that reduce the size of an instance to be polynomially bounded by the number m of proposals or the number n of voters. In other words, UNAAB and MAJAB are unlikely to allow for polynomial kernels with respect to the parameters n or m, respectively. Unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly, both problems do not have a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter m even without hidden agenda: Reduction 1 is a polynomial-time reduction from the NP-complete HITTING SET problem; the number m of proposals in the reduced instance equals |U | + k + 1; and Q + = ∅. A polynomial kernel of UNAAB parameterized by m would yield a polynomial kernel of HITTING SET parameterized by |U | + k. However, Dom et al. [2014] showed that the latter admits no polynomial kernels unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly.
Thus, even without hidden agenda, UNAAB does not admit a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter m. Due to Observation 2, the nonexistence of polynomial kernels transfers to MAJAB even without hidden agenda. PROOF. We first describe how to formulate MAJAB as an ILP and show how to modify the ILP to also work for UNAAB. Let N V be the number of proposals that are accepted by the voter set V and rejected by the rest, that is,
As the proposals counted by N V only depend on V , we refer to V as a proposal type. Let x V be the number of proposals of type V in the ballot Q. Further, let N + V be the number of proposals in Q + that are accepted by the voter set V ⊆ V and rejected by the rest, that is, N 
V ⊆V: i∈V
Constraint (1) requires that a strict majority of voters is happy with Q, while Constraint (2) requires that the number of proposals in Q ∩ Q + is at least q + . Constraint set (3) ensures that if variable z i is set to 1, then voter i is happy: if z i = 1, then the right-hand side equals 1 and the number of proposals that voter i accepts (that is, V ⊆V:i∈V x V ) is larger than the number of proposals that voter i rejects (that is,
. If z i = 0, then the right-hand side equals −m and the constraint is fulfilled even if voter i rejects all the proposals. Constraint set (4) (Constraint set (5), respectively) restricts the number of proposals of each type in Q ∩ Q + (in Q, respectively) to those actually present. Moreover, Constraint set (5) expresses the relation of variables x + V and x V . It requires that the number of proposals of each type in Q is at least the number of proposals of this type in both Q and Q + .
Our ILP contains at most 2 n variables x V , 2 n variables x + V , and n variables z i . The total number of constraints is at most 2 · 2 n + n + 2. Since the "integer feasibility problem" (that is, an ILP without objective function) with ρ variables and L input bits can be solved in O(ρ 2.5ρ+o(ρ) L) time [Lenstra 1983; Kannan 1987; Frank and Tardos 1987] , MAJAB is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number n of voters.
If we delete Constraint (1) and the variables z i , and replace the right-hand sides of Constraint set (3) with 1, then we gain an ILP for UNAAB with at most 2 · 2 n variables and 2 · 2 n + n + 1 constraints. Thus, UNAAB is also fixed-parameter tractable with respect to parameter n.
Unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly, even without hidden agenda, both problems do not have a polynomial kernel with respect to the parameter n: Reduction 1 is a polynomialtime reduction from the NP-complete problem HITTING SET; the number n of voters in the reduced instance is linearly bounded by the number r of sets in the instance one reduces from; and Q + = ∅. A polynomial kernel of UNAAB with Q + = ∅ parameterized by n would yield a polynomial kernel for HITTING SET parameterized by r. However, this is not possible unless NP ⊆ coNP/poly (cf. Hermelin et al. [2015, Theorem 5] ). Thus, even without hidden agenda, UNAAB does not admit a polynomial kernel. Neither does MAJAB admit a polynomial kernel even without hidden agenda due to Observation 2.
Small Ballots
In this subsection, we perform a parameterized complexity analysis concerning parameters based on the ballot sizes. We start with the size h of the solution ballot. For technical reasons, we need to assume that h is given as part of the input when dealing with the parameterized problems and denotes an upper bound for the size of the solution ballot Q. To show parameterized intractability for the parameter h, we use the following lemma that basically says that for UNAAB we may assume without loss of generality that ballot Q has size exactly h.
LEMMA 2. Given an instance I of UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BALLOT, we define a modified instance I by duplicating each voter and by adding h/2 dummy proposals and h/2 copy proposals so that each original voter additionally supports all dummy proposals and each duplicate voter additionally supports all the copy proposals. Then, there is a unanimously accepted ballot of size at most h for I if and only if there is a unanimously accepted ballot of size exactly h for I .
PROOF. For the "only if " part, suppose that a ballot Q with |Q| ≤ h is accepted by all voters in I. We assume that |Q| and h are odd since every voter that is happy with a ballot of even size is still happy if one removes an arbitrary proposal. Then, adding (h − |Q|)/2 dummy proposals and (h − |Q|)/2 copy proposals to Q results in a ballot of size h that is accepted by all voters in I .
For the "if " part, suppose that a ballot Q with |Q | = h is accepted by all voters in I . Then delete all dummy and copy proposals from Q to obtain a ballot Q that is accepted by all voters in I. By applying Observation 1(i) to any original voter and its duplicate one knows that Q is nonempty. Assume toward a contradiction that there is a voter in I that is not happy with Q. Since the corresponding voter in I is happy with Q , ballot Q contains more dummy proposals than copy proposals. Then, the corresponding duplicate voter is not happy with Q , a contradiction.
Note that I and I have the same agenda (Q + , q + ) (we initially copied I to obtain I ) and adding or removing proposals that are not in Q + from a ballot Q has no influence on whether |Q + ∩ Q| ≥ q + .
Due to Lemma 2 we can assume without loss of generality that given any upper bound h on the size of the solution ballot every unanimously accepted ballot has size exactly h. We use this in the W[2]-membership proof for UNAAB parameterized by h leading to the following theorem. .) Given an undirected graph G = (U, E) and an integer k, IDS asks whether there is an independent dominating set of k vertices, that is, whether there exists a U ⊆ U with |U | = k such that no pair of vertices from U is adjacent and each vertex from U \ U is adjacent to at least one vertex from U .
In the following, we use [z] to denote the set {1, . . . , z} with z ∈ N. Let I := (P, V, (Q + , q + ), h) be an instance of UNAAB with n voters and m proposals where h denotes an upper bound for the size of the solution ballot. Let B 1 , . . . , B n denote the favorite ballots of the voters. We construct an instance I = ((U, E), k) of IDS as follows. The vertex set U consists of proposal vertices, voter vertices, agenda vertices, and dummy vertices. There are h layers of proposal vertices each containing one vertex for each proposal. We say that the proposal vertex p j corresponds to proposal j in layer . We enumerate all subsets of [h] of size h/2 . In the following, let H x denote the xth of these subsets and set The edge set E is constructed as follows. Two proposal vertices are adjacent if they correspond to the same proposal or are in the same layer, that is, We set the size k of the independent dominating set to h. This completes the construction, which is illustrated in Figure 3 . Now, we highlight two properties of the constructed instance that help to prove the correctness of the reduction. First, the proposal vertices from the same layer and the proposal vertices corresponding to the same proposal form a complete subgraph, respectively. Hence, an independent dominating set may contain at most one proposal vertex from each layer and no two proposal vertices corresponding to the same proposal. Second, taking a different proposal vertex from each layer into the dominating set is the only way to form an independent set of size k such that all dummy vertices and all other proposal vertices are dominated. Due to Lemma 2 it remains to show that every voter in I is happy with some ballot Q with |Q| = h and |Q + ∩ Q| ≥ q + if and only if the constructed graph has an independent dominating set of size k = h.
For the "only if " part, suppose that every voter is happy with the ballot Q := { j 1 , . . . , j h } and |Q + ∩ Q| ≥ q + . Without loss of generality, let { j 1 , . . . , j q + } ⊆ Q + , that is, we fix an ordering of the proposals in Q such that the first q + proposals are from Q + . We show that the vertex set U = {p
} is an independent dominating set for I. As discussed previously, U is an independent set and all dummy vertices as well as proposal vertices are either in U or adjacent to a vertex in U . So, suppose for the sake of contradiction that a voter vertex v that agenda vertex a is not dominated by U . However, we already know that p j ∈ Q + and there is an edge between p j and a , a contradiction.
For the "if " part, due to the preceding observations we know that the vertices forming an independent dominating set must be proposal vertices (from h different layers). Now, suppose that U := {p
} is an independent dominating set of size h. First, we show that every voter in I is happy with Q := { j 1 , . . . , j h }. The ballot Q is of size h because U is an independent set, and hence, there are no two proposal vertices in U corresponding to the same proposal. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that voter i is not happy with Q. In the remainder of this subsection we prove Theorem 2.5. The nonexistence of a polynomial kernel for UNAAB with respect to parameter m shown in Theorem 2.2 also holds for parameter b max , as b max ≤ m. Although there is no hope for polynomial kernels, we at least show fixed-parameter tractability for UNAAB parameterized by b max by a depth-bounded search tree algorithm. PROOF. Let I = (P, V, (Q + , q + )) denote an instance of UNAAB with
Observe that any ballot Q that makes every voter happy contains at most 2b max − 1 proposals, otherwise the intersection of Q and any favorite ballot has at most b max proposals but b max ≤ |Q|/2. Using this observation, we describe a depth-bounded search tree algorithm solving the optimization version of UNAAB, that is, it computes a solution ballot Q with the largest intersection Q ∩ Q + such that every voter is happy with Q, or it returns "no" if there is no such ballot. The algorithm works as follows. Start with branching over the upper bound size h ∈ {1, . . . , 2b max − 1} of the solution and initialize Q ← ∅ in each branch. Repeat the following until all voters are satisfied or |Q| = h: Mark every voter i with |B i ∩ Q| > h/2 as satisfied and branch into adding one proposal from B j \ Q to Q for an arbitrary unsatisfied voter j. Finally, if all voters are satisfied, then the computed ballot Q makes every voter happy since |B i ∩ Q| > h/2 ≥ |Q|/2 for each i ∈ V; otherwise, discard this branch, because this path of the search tree cannot lead to a solution as the size of ballot Q reaches the upper bound h but there is some voter j with |B j ∩ Q| ≤ h/2 . Finally, if |Q| < h, then fill up Q with h − |Q| arbitrary proposals from Q + . It is easy to verify that the ballot Q having the largest intersection with Q + among all ballots in the leaves of the search tree is an optimal solution, that is, among all possible ballots that make all voters happy, ballot Q also has the largest intersection with Q + .
The search tree has depth at most 2b max , since the size of Q is increased in each branching step and |Q| ≤ 2b max . [Fellows et al. 2010 ] (cf. ). Given an undirected graph G = (U, E) and an integer k, MVC asks whether there is a subset of k vertices that covers a majority of the edges of G, that is, is there a size-k subset U ⊆ U with |{e ∈ E | e ∩ U = ∅}| > |E|/2? Let (G, k) be an instance of MVC with U denoting the set of vertices and E = {e 1 , . . . , e s } denoting the set of edges. Now, construct a MAJAB instance as follows. The proposal set P is defined as U ∪ D with D being a set of k − 1 dummy proposals. For each edge e j ∈ E there is one voter with the favorite ballot B j = e j ∪ D. Furthermore, the agenda consists of Q + = U and q + = k. This completes the construction that runs in polynomial time. It is illustrated by an example in Figure 4 . Next, we show that (G, k) is a yes-instance for MVC if and only if the constructed instance is a yes-instance for MAJAB.
For the "only if " part, suppose that there is a subset U ⊆ U of k vertices covering more than s/2 edges. Then, Q = U ∪ D is a solution for our MAJAB instance: Furthermore, |Q| = 2k − 1 and |Q + ∩ Q| = k. Since |B j ∩ Q| = |D| + |U ∩ e j | ≥ k for each covered edge e j , more than s/2 voters are happy.
For the "if " part, we first assume that s/2 ≥ (
). Otherwise, add to the graph G a tree consisting of a root with (
) children each of which has a single leaf. This results in an equivalent instance ((U , E ),
). Suppose that there is a ballot Q ⊆ P that a majority of voters is happy with, and |Q ∩ Q + | ≥ k. Note that adding all dummy proposals to Q also results in a feasible solution. Thus, we assume that Q contains all k − 1 dummy proposals. Then, ballot Q must contain at least one vertex proposal in each of the happy voters' favorite ballots. This implies that the edges corresponding to the happy voters are covered by the vertices corresponding to the voters in Q. As a majority of voters is happy, a majority of edges is covered. Finally, we show that the number of vertex proposals in Q is exactly k. Observe that ballot Q can have at most k + 2 vertex proposals since otherwise no voter is happy: each voter supports at most two vertex proposals and k − 1 dummy proposals, and hence, a solution cannot have more than k unsupported vertex proposals. Furthermore, there are at most ( least one happy voter j such that only one vertex proposal in his favorite ballot B j is contained in Q. This implies that Q can only be of size 2k − 1, and hence, contains exactly k vertex proposals, since otherwise voter j is not happy. To show the W[1] containment, we describe a tail-nondeterministic b max -restricted NRAM program P to decide MAJAB. Given a MAJAB instance I = (P, V, (Q + , q + )) with |P| = m, we say that a ballot Q ⊆ P is crucial if it is a subset of the favorite ballot B j for some voter j ∈ V, that is, ∃ j ∈ V : Q ⊆ B j . The deterministic phase of P works as follows. For each crucial ballot Q the program P counts and stores the number of voters whose favorite ballots are supersets of Q ; we denote this number as z[Q ] in the following. Since the maximum size of the favorite ballots is b max , table z can be filled in f (b max ) · (nm) c time where f is a function only depending on b max and c is a constant. Every number in z has value at most n. The program P uses an additional counter z 0 to store the number of happy voters.
We remark that a straightforward implementation of table z would use O(b max · m b max ) registers since a crucial ballot Q ⊆ P can have up to b max proposals. Furthermore, in the nondeterministic phase we assume that P can decide whether a ballot is crucial in f (b max ) steps; we address both these issues at the end of the membership proof.
As for the nondeterministic phase of P (see Algorithm 1 for the pseudocode), note that any ballot making more than half of the voters happy contains at most 2b max proposals. Hence, the program P guesses a ballot Q with |Q + ∩ Q| ≥ q + and |Q| ≤ 2b max . Checking whether Q is a solution works as follows. Let us now explain how to implement table z using only the first f (b max ) · poly(|I|) registers and how to decide whether a ballot is crucial. For detecting crucial ballots we show that it is sufficient to be able to have certificates for crucial ballots and for "pseudocrucial" ballots. To this end, we additionally store z[Q ] = 0 for every ballot Q that is pseudocrucial, that is, for every ballot Q that is not crucial itself but contains a proposal whose (single) removal would yield a crucial ballot. This enlarges the table z by a factor of at most m (as all candidates for being pseudocrucial can be obtained by adding one of the m proposals to some crucial ballot). Note that a ballot is noncrucial if and only if it has a subset that is pseudocrucial, because we can assume without loss of generality that every singleton from P is crucial. Thus, a pseudocrucial subset Q ⊆ Q is a certificate for Q being noncrucial.
The table implementation is based on the fact that P actually uses only f (b max ) · poly(|I|) entries. To ensure that we only use the first f (b max ) · poly(|I|) registers we store the entries of table z in an unordered fashion in the first registers, but we augment the entry for each of such ballots Q by additionally storing Q itself; each of these augmentations has size at most O(b max · log m) for encoding up to b max proposals in each ballot Q . Note that, for simplicity, we could just use a pair of registers for each entry. Throughout the filling of the table, this makes no difference as we have f (b max ) · poly(|I|) time available and can afford sequential search for entries, if needed.
The essential idea for querying z[Q ] is to use nondeterminism to guess the position of a required table entry in the unordered sequence of entries and to check whether the augmented entry stored in this entry corresponds to Q . The essential idea for deciding whether a ballot Q is crucial is to simply guess and search for a certificate showing that the guess was correct.
More precisely, P does the following nondeterministic preprocessing. For each subset Q ⊆ Q, program P guesses whether Q is crucial. Then P guesses For Case (a), program P checks whether the augmented entry corresponds to ballot Q and z[Q ] > 0: If this is the case, then the guess was correct and P stores the position of the table entry for later access; otherwise, P returns "no." For Case (b), program P checks whether the augmented entry corresponds to some pseudocrucial subset of Q ⊆ Q (including Q itself) and whether z[Q ] = 0: If this is the case, then Q is pseudocrucial, which means that Q is noncrucial and that the guess was correct; otherwise, P returns "no." It is easy to see that if we have a yes-instance and an appropriate ballot Q, then there exist correct guesses such that for at least one set of guesses the machine will answer "yes," as needed. If we have a no-instance and P returns "yes," then one of the guesses was wrong. However, this is not possible since P validates the correctness of each single guess or returns "no." 
Further Parameterizations
In the previous subsections, we discussed parameters whose motivation is quite clear already from their definitions as all these parameters measure something that can be relatively small in realistic instances. Next, we discuss a parameter that may not immediately seem interesting from its definition. More precisely, we consider the "below guarantee parameter" [Mahajan and Raman 1999] b gap = (m + 1)/2 − min i∈V |B i | measuring the distance to trivial yes-instances. To this end, observe that an instance of UNAAB or MAJAB is a yes-instance if the minimum size of the favorite ballots is at least (m + 1)/2 where m denotes the total number of proposals in P. However, both problems become NP-complete when this minimum size is one less than the guarantee (m+ 1)/2 , even without hidden agenda. This implies that there is no hope for fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the "below guarantee parameter" b gap . PROOF. As for the first statement, choosing Q = P makes every voter happy. To show the second statement, we many-one reduce from the NP-complete VERTEX COVER (VC) problem. Given an undirected graph G = (U, E) and an integer k ≤ |U |, VC asks whether there is a vertex cover of at most k vertices, that is, whether there is a set U ⊆ U with |U | ≤ k and for each e ∈ E we have e ∩ U = ∅.
Let I = ((U, E), k) with vertex set U = {u 1 , . . . , u r } and edge set E = {e 1 , . . . , e s } be a VC instance where we assume without loss of generality that r ≥ k + 2. We first reduce from it to an instance I for UNAAB and then extend this reduced instance I to an instance I for MAJAB.
Both instances I and I have the same proposal set P. It consists of one special proposal α, of all vertices in U , of k dummy proposals β j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), and of r − k additional dummy proposals γ j (1 ≤ j ≤ r − k). Thus, |P| = 2r + 1.
Instance I contains four types of voters: one voter v 0 , one voter v 0 , s edge voters, and r − kvertex haters. Voter v 0 supports proposal α and all the r dummy proposals. Voter v 0 also supports proposal α, and all the vertices in U . For 1 ≤ i ≤ s, the ith edge voter's favorite ballot A i consists of the two vertices in e i , of all the k dummy proposals β j , and of r − k − 2 arbitrarily chosen dummy proposals from {γ 1 , . . . , γ r−k }. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r − k, the favorite ballot B i of vertex hater i consists of α and of all dummy proposals but γ i . In total, the number of voters in I is s + r − k + 2, with each voter supporting at least r = |P|/2 proposals. Set Q + := ∅ and q + := 0. This reduction can be computed in polynomial time; it is illustrated with an example in Figure 5 .
To show the reduction's correctness, we have to show that I has a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if there is a ballot Q ⊆ P that all the voters in I are happy with.
For the "only if " part, suppose that U ⊆ U with |U | ≤ k is a vertex cover. We show that every voter is happy with Q = {α} ∪ {β j | 1 ≤ j ≤ |U |} ∪ U . First, the size of Q is 2|U | + 1. To make a voter happy, at least |U | + 1 of his favorite proposals must be also in Q. Voters v 0 , v 0 and all vertex haters are happy with Q. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , s}, Q∩ A i contains all dummy proposals β j with 1 ≤ j ≤ |U | and at least one vertex proposal v j with v j ∈ e i ∩ U since U is a vertex cover. This sums up to at least |U | + 1 proposals. Hence, every edge voter is also happy with Q.
For the "if " part, by applying Observation 1(ii) to the ballots of voters v 0 and v 0 , ballot Q must contain α, and furthermore, Q contains an equal number x of vertex proposals and dummy proposals. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , r − k}, ballot Q cannot contain dummy proposal γ i since otherwise |B i ∩ Q| = x < |Q|/2 + 1. Thus, vertex hater i would not be happy. Therefore, the x dummy proposals must come from {β 1 , . . . , β k } and x ≤ k. To make the ith edge voter happy, ballot Q must satisfy the condition |Q ∩ A i | ≥ x + 1. But since no edge voter supports proposal α, ballot Q must contain at least one proposal u j ∈ A i . By definition of A i , the corresponding vertex u j is incident to edge e i . This implies that the x vertices in Q form a vertex cover for (U, E).
Next, we extend instance I to instance I for MAJAB by adding r − k vertex lovers who have the same favorite ballot U , and s edge-inverse voters such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ s, edge-inverse voter i's favorite ballot C i = (U ∪ {γ 1 , . . . , γ r−k }) \ A i . Thus, C i and A i are disjoint for all 1 ≤ i ≤ s. In total, I has 2(s + r − k) + 2 voters. Since each of the newly added voters supports exactly r proposals, the constraint that each voter's proposal set has at least r = |P|/2 holds. This extension can also be computed in polynomial time.
Now we show the correctness of the extended reduction, that is, I has a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if there is a ballot Q ⊆ P that more than half of the voters in I are happy with.
For the "only if " part, the ballot Q as constructed in the preceding "only if " part makes all voters in I happy. This sums up to s + r − k + 2. Since I contains all the voters from I and has 2(s + r − k) + 2 voters, this also means that more than half of the voters in I are happy with Q.
For the "if " part, for 1 ≤ i ≤ s, the ith edge voter and the ith edge-inverse voter do not share a common favorite proposal. Furthermore, no vertex hater's favorite ballot intersects any vertex lover's favorite ballot. Hence, by applying Observation 1(i), any ballot can make at most s voters from the edge voters and the edge-inverse voters happy, and can make at most r − k voters from the vertex haters and the newly constructed vertex lovers happy. But I has 2(s + r − k) + 2 voters. This means that in order to be a solution ballot for I , Q must make both v 0 and v 0 happy. By applying Observation 1(ii), Q must then contain α, and, furthermore, Q contains the same number x of vertex proposals and dummy proposals. The ballot Q cannot make any vertex lover happy since his favorite ballot and Q have an intersection of size x that is smaller than |Q|/2 + 1. Thus, Q needs to make all vertex haters happy. Then, Q cannot contain any dummy proposal γ i since otherwise the vertex hater i is not happy due to |B i ∩ Q| = x < |Q|/2 + 1. Hence, Q contains x dummy proposals from {β 1 , . . . , β k } with x ≤ k. Then, no edge-inverse voter is happy with Q since at most x proposals from his favorite ballot are in Q. This means that all edge voters must be happy with Q. To make the ith edge voter happy, Q must intersect with A i in at least one vertex u j ∈ A i . By definition of A i , the corresponding vertex u j is incident to edge e i . Thus, the x vertices in Q form a vertex cover for (U, E).
We conclude this subsection with a brief discussion on the relation between the parameters "maximum size b max of the favorite ballots" and "the size h max of the maximum symmetric difference between any two favorite ballots." As the following proposition shows, for the cases without hidden agenda, the two parameters h max and b max are "equivalent" in terms of parameterized complexity theory: The fact that for two parameters x and y one has x = (y) implies that the parameterization by x and the parameterization by y are in the same level of the W-hierarchy and yield the same parameterized hardness results. PROOF. The first statement follows as h max equals max i, j∈V (|B i \ B j | + |B j \ B i |), which is bounded by 2b max . For the second statement, note that h max < b max /2 implies that every voter is happy with the favorite ballot B of a voter with |B | = b max . To see this, consider some voter i . Now,
COMBINATORIAL BOUNDS ON MINIMAL ACCEPTED BALLOTS
We say that a unanimously (majoritywise, respectively) accepted ballot is minimal if no proper subset of it is also unanimously (majoritywise, respectively) accepted. In this section, we investigate the largest possible size of a minimal unanimously accepted ballot for the situation with n voters and Q + = ∅. We derive (almost tight) upper and lower bounds on this quantity. From this bound, a similar result can be derived for majoritywise accepted ballots. Note that with a nonempty agenda set the size of a minimal unanimously (majoritywise, respectively) accepted ballot cannot be expressed by a function only depending on n; it may additionally depend on q + .
It is not hard to see that both upper and lower bounds come down to studying the case where the set P of all proposals already is a minimal accepted ballot: Such instances cannot have smaller solutions (giving a lower bound), and upper bounds directly carry over to Q ⊆ P by considering a restricted instance with P := Q. To make the question more amenable to combinatorial tools we translate it into a problem on a sequence of vectors with {−1, 1}-entries: Given n voters and m proposals we create m vectors x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ {−1, 1} n ; the ith entry in vector x j is 1 if the jth proposal is contained in the favorite ballot of voter i, else it is −1. In this formulation, a unanimously accepted ballot Q corresponds to a subset of the vectors whose vector sum is positive in each coordinate: Considering some voter i, for each proposal in B i ∩ Q we incur 1, and for each proposal in Q \ B i we incur −1. If |B i ∩ Q| > |Q|/2, then this gives a positive sum in coordinate i; the converse is true as well.
Let us normalize the question a little more. First of all, no minimal ballot can be of even size: Otherwise, all coordinate sums would be even and hence each sum is at least 2; then, however, we may discard an arbitrary vector and still retain sums of at least 1 each. Secondly, it is clear that replacing +1 entries by −1 entries does not introduce additional subsequences with positive coordinate sums. Thus, we may restrict ourselves to the case where the coordinate sums over the minimal sequence of m vectors are all equal to 1 (the row sums over an odd number of +1 and −1 values are odd, and each replacement of a +1 by a −1 lowers the corresponding sum by 2). Now, a collection of vectors is called a minimal majority sequence of dimension n (an n-mms for short) if all its coordinate-wise sums are 1 and no proper subsequence of the vectors has a positive sum in each coordinate. Note that an n-mms cannot contain a nonempty subsequence S whose sum is at most 0 in each coordinate, since otherwise the sum of the vectors that are in this n-mms but not in S must be positive in each coordinate-a contradiction to the minimality of an n-mms. Thus, the definition of an n-mms is equivalent to the condition that all its coordinate-wise sums are 1 and no nonempty subsequence has sum of at most 0 in each coordinate. The length of the sequence is the number m of its elements. Let f (n) denote the maximum possible length of an n-mms. In this section, we show that f (n) ≈ n n/2+o(n) .
THEOREM 3.1. The maximum possible length f (n) of a minimal majority sequence of dimension n satisfies
The proof combines the main result of Alon and Vu [1997] with arguments from Linear Algebra, Geometry, and Discrepancy Theory. Before turning to the proof presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, let us give a corollary for the effect on UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BALLOT and MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT. −o(t) , respectively, where t = (n + 1)/2 denotes the majority threshold.
PROOF. As the correspondence between favorite ballots and vector sequences has been thoroughly discussed earlier for the unanimous case, we now concentrate on the majority case.
To see the lower bound for the majority case, we start from a lower bound example for the unanimous case with t old voters and a minimum accepted ballot size of t t/2−o(t) , and we add n − t < n/2 new voters with empty favorite ballots to it. Note that the resulting instance has a total of n voters and that its majority threshold indeed is t. Then, any majoritywise accepted ballot must be unanimously accepted by the t old voters, so that the minimum majoritywise accepted ballot has size at least t t/2−o(t) .
For the upper bound, consider any majoritywise accepted ballot Q for n voters and consider any minimal majority of t voters that (amongst themselves) unanimously accept this ballot. Then, any other unanimously accepted ballot for these voters is also majoritywise accepted by all n voters, so that we get the desired upper bound of (t + 1) (t+1)/2 on the size of Q.
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 3.1 by first showing the upper bound (Section 3.1) and then the lower bound (Section 3.2).
Upper Bound
One way to obtain an upper bound on f (n) is to apply a known result of Sevastyanov [1978] . It asserts that any sequence of vectors whose sum is the zero vector, where the vectors lie in an arbitrary n-dimensional normed space R and each of them has norm at most 1, can be permuted so that all initial sums of the permuted sequence are of norm at most n. We will apply this result using the maximum norm l ∞ . Thus, given an n-mms
n , append to it the vector −1 where 1 is the all 1 vector of length n to get a zero-sum sequence of m + 1 vectors in R n , where the ∞ norm of each vector is 1. By the previously mentioned result there is a permutation u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u m+1 of these vectors so that the ∞ -norm of each initial sum
n , then by the pigeonhole principle, some two distinct initial sums are equal. It follows that summing over the set of vectors appearing only in the longer sequence gives 0. This implies a proper subsequence of the original mms with sum either 0 (if this set does not include the vector −1), or 1 (if it does). In both cases, this contradicts the assumption that the original sequence is an mms. This shows that f (n) ≤ (2n + 1)
n . See Alon and Berman [1986] for a similar argument.
The proof of the stronger upper bound stated in Theorem 3.1 is similar to that of a result of Huckeman, Jurkat, and Shapley (cf. Graver [1973] ) and is based on some simple facts from convex geometry. The details follow.
Let u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u t be a sequence of pairwise distinct nonzero vectors in R n , and let C = C(u 1 , . . . , u t ) denote the cone
A point x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ) ∈ C is called basic if the vectors {u i | i ∈ I} are affinely independent, where I is the support of x, that is, the set I = {i | x i > 0}. Note that in this case |I| ≤ n + 1, and the nonzero coordinates of the vector (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ) form a solution of the system i∈I u i x i = 0, which has a unique solution, up to a constant factor. PROOF. We apply induction on . The assertion is clear for ≤ 2. Indeed, there is no vector in C with support of size smaller than 2, as the vectors u i are distinct nonzero vectors. Moreover, every vector of C with support of size 2 is basic, since any two distinct vectors u i are affinely independent. Assuming the lemma holds for all < , we prove it for . By assumption, 0 lies in the convex hull of the vectors {u i | x i > 0}. Let p be the minimum dimension of a facet of this convex hull that includes 0. The extreme points of this facet are p + 1 of the vectors u i , which are affinely independent. Therefore, there is a basic point of the cone whose support is the set of these p + 1 vectors. We can now subtract from x an appropriate positive multiple of this basic point, keeping x nonnegative and reducing the size of its support by at least 1. This completes the proof of the lemma. LEMMA 4. Suppose that u i ∈ {−1, 1} n for all i. Let y be an integral basic point of C, and suppose that the greatest common divisor of the nonzero coordinates of y is 1. Then the PROOF. Let p + 1 (≤ n + 1) be the size of the support of y. Then, by Cramer's rule there is a p by p + 1 matrix C with {−1, 1}-entries so that the ith nonzero entry of y is given by
where C i is the matrix obtained from C by omitting column number i. Each of the determinants det(C i ) is the determinant of a p by p matrix with {−1, 1}-entries. By adding the first row to each of the others we get a matrix in which all rows but the first are divisible by 2, hence the determinant is divisible by 2 p−1 , implying that the denominator of (6) is at least 2 p−1 . In addition, by appending to C the all-1-vectors of length p + 1 as a first row we get a p + 1 by p + 1 matrix with {−1, 1}-entries whose determinant is the 1 -norm of y. The assertion of the lemma thus follows from Hadamard's inequality [Hadamard 1893 ]. . . , u t be a sequence consisting of all distinct vectors in the sequence S, and let x i be the number of times u i appears in this sequence. Then t ≤ 2 n−1 , since S cannot contain a vector and its inverse, and the vector x = (x 1 , x 2 . . . , x t ) belongs to the cone C(u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u t ). By Lemma 3 this vector is a positive linear combination of less than t basic integral points of the cone. Note that each such coefficient is at most 1, since otherwise the corresponding basic integral point provides a proper subsequence of S with zero sum, a contradiction. By Lemma 4 the 1 -norm of each integral basic point is at most 2 1−n (n + 1) (n+1)/2 . Therefore, the 1 -norm of x, which is the length of S, that is, m + 1, is at most t · 2 1−n (n + 1) (n+1)/2 ≤ (n + 1) (n+1)/2 , completing the proof.
Lower Bound
We use the following result by Alon and Vu [1997] .
LEMMA 5. For every k there exists a nonsingular k by k matrix A with {−1, 1}-entries, so that the maximum entry of the inverse of A is at least k k/2−o(k) . This is tight up to the o(k) term.
We will also use the following result by Spencer [1985] .
LEMMA 6. For any k by k + 1 matrix A with {−1, 1}-entries, one can change the sign of some of the rows of A to get a matrix A so that the absolute value of the sum of entries in each column of A is less than 6 √ k. This is tight up to the constant 6.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1, LOWER BOUND. By Lemma 5 and Cramer's rule (and by permuting rows and columns, if needed), there is a k by k matrix A with {−1, 1}-entries, so that the ratio between det(A 11 ) and det(A) is at least k k/2−o(k) , where A ij is the submatrix of A obtained by deleting row number i and column number j. Add to A a column c with {−1, 1}-entries, where c i = sign(det(A i1 )). Then, by Cramer's rule, the unique solution
This implies that the unique positive integral linear dependence among the columns of the extended k by k + 1 matrix consisting of A and c, in which the greatest common divisor of the entries is 1, has 1 norm at least k k/2−o(k) , since there is an integral solution in which the first coordinate is at least det(A 11 ) and the last is det(A). By changing the signs of some of these columns, if needed, we get k+ 1 column vectors in {−1, 1} k so that there is an integral positive linear combination of them with coefficients x 1 , x 2 , . . . x k+1 that sums to zero, the greatest common divisor of its coefficients x i is 1, and its 1 norm
Moreover, since any linear combination of these columns that sums to zero is a multiple of this one, there is no nontrivial integral nonnegative combination of these vectors that sums to zero in which the coefficients y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k+1 satisfy 0 ≤ y i ≤ x i for all i and y i < x i . Consider the k by k+ 1 matrix whose columns are the preceding vectors. By Lemma 6 one can change the signs of some of the rows of this matrix to ensure that the absolute value of the sum of entries in each column is smaller than 6 √ k. Denote the resulting column vectors by w 1 , . . . , w k+1 and note that x i w i = 0 for the integers x i as before, and if y i w i = 0 for nonnegative integers y i ≤ x i , then either y i = 0 for all i or y i = x i for all i. Put t = i x i and let B be the k by t matrix obtained by picking each column w i exactly x i times. Then the sum of columns of B is the zero vector, and no proper subset of the columns has zero sum.
Next, we add a (relatively small) number of rows to B to get a matrix in which the sum of every row and the sum of every column is zero. To do so, let s ≤ 6 √ k be an integer so that s + k is even and so that the absolute value of the sum of any column of B is at most s.
LEMMA 7.
There is a matrix B obtained from B by adding to it s rows of {−1, 1}-entries, so that the sum of every row and every column of B is 0. PROOF. Let s j be the sum of entries of the jth column of B. Note that s j = 0 (as the sum of columns of B is the zero vector), that |s j | ≤ s for all j, and that s j has the same parity as s. We have to show that there is an s by t matrix with {−1, 1}-entries, in which the sum of elements in column number j is −s j and the sum of elements in every row is 0.
One possible proof of that is to apply the well-known Gale-Ryser theorem (cf. West [2001, Theorem 4.3.18] ), which gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a {0, 1} matrix with prescribed row and column sums. Another possibility is to describe explicitly a cyclic procedure for completing the new entries of B . The shortest proof seems, however, to consider, among all s by t matrices M with {−1, 1}-entries in which the sum of entries in column number j is −s j , the one in which the sum of squares of row sums is minimum. If this sum of squares is 0 we are done, else, there is a row with positive sum, and a row with negative sum (as the sum of all row sums is zero). Let these two rows be rows numbers p and q. Then there is some column j so that entry M p, j = 1 and entry M q, j = −1. Swapping those to M p, j = −1 and M q, j = 1 reduces the sum of squares (note that every row sum is even so if it is positive it is at least 2), contradicting the minimality. This completes the proof of the lemma.
We can now define our n = (k + s)-mms. Put m = t + 1, and let the first t − 1 vectors v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v t−1 in the sequence be the columns of B , without the last one. This last vector has +1 in a set J of n/2 coordinates, and −1 in its complement. Therefore, the sum of the vectors v 1 , . . . , v t−1 is −1 in the coordinates of J and +1 in the other coordinates. We now add two vectors v t and v t+1 to our sequence. Both vectors have +1 in the coordinates of J, whereas in the other coordinates one of them has −1 and one has +1, ensuring that each of them has at least one +1 in these coordinates. Note that the sum of coordinates of v t is strictly positive, and so is the sum of coordinates of v t+1 . Note also that the sum of all t + 1 vectors v i is the all 1 vector.
It is not difficult to check that there is no nonempty subsequence of the sequence v i for which the sum in every entry is at most 0. Indeed, suppose there is such a subsequence. As the sum of coordinates of every vector v i for i < t is 0, and the sum of coordinates of v t and of v t+1 is positive, this subsequence can contain neither v t nor v t+1 . Thus, the sum of its elements must be the zero vector, because the sum of its coordinates is 0 and they are all nonpositive. However, if this is the case, then the sum of the vectors of length k obtained from the vectors in the subsequence by taking the first k coordinates of each vector is also the (k-dimensional) zero vector. This contradicts the property of the matrix B, showing that indeed v 1 , . . . , v t+1 is an n-mms.
Note that n = k + O( √ k) and thus m = t −o(n) . Note also that the definition easily implies that f (n + 1) ≥ f (n) for every n, and therefore it is enough to prove the lower bound for a sufficiently dense set of values of n (for example, all large even numbers) to get a similar estimate for every n. This completes the proof.
CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We have introduced problems in computational social choice that model the task of finding a bundle of proposals that is accepted by a society of voters while containing a specific number of proposals from an agenda set. This can be seen as an extension of a special case of approval voting for committee election by threshold functions as introduced by Fishburn and Pekeč [2004] (see also Kilgour [2010] and Kilgour and Marshall [2012] ). We studied the computational complexity of our problems and revealed both (fixed-parameter) tractable and intractable special cases. Furthermore, we started an analysis of their combinatorial properties. We conclude this article with a few challenges for future research.
First, recall that in Theorem 2.10 we stated upper bounds on h max (the size of the maximum symmetric difference between two favorite ballots) in terms of linear functions in b max (the maximum ballot size of voters). Hence, parameterized hardness results with respect to b max transfer to the parameterization by h max . In the case of nonempty agenda, that is, q + ≥ 1, however, we have no good lower bounds for h max in terms of b max . Thus, it remains to classify the parameterized computational complexity of both UNANIMOUSLY ACCEPTED BALLOT and MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT using parameter h max . Notably, in the cases without hidden agenda the parameters h max and b max are linearly related so that the same parameterized complexity results will hold for both parameterizations.
Second, with respect to the parameter h (the size of the solution ballot Q), we established W[2]-hardness for MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT even without hidden agenda, but we left open the precise location of this problem in the parameterized complexity hierarchy. It might be W[2]-complete, but all we currently know is that it is contained in W[2] (Maj), a class presumably larger than W[2] [Fellows et al. 2010] . See also a recent survey [Bredereck et al. 2014a ] for a more detailed description of this challenge.
Third, the combinatorial bounds from Section 3 do not hold for instances with nonempty agenda, since such bounds cannot be independent of |Q + |. For cases with nonempty agenda there are similar bounds with an extra factor of |Q + |. A detailed analysis could be part of investigations of weighted variants of our problems. In this regard, weights on the voters, weights on the proposals, or weights on the acceptance threshold of the voters seem to be well motivated.
Fourth, can we avoid ILPs for showing fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the parameter number n of votes and provide direct combinatorial algorithms beating the ILP-based running times? In this context, the exponential lower bound on the number of proposals in ballots accepted by society from Section 3 might be relevant.
Fifth, it remains a puzzling open question whether MAJORITYWISE ACCEPTED BALLOT parameterized by b max is fixed-parameter tractable when the agenda set is empty-we could only show W[1]-hardness for instances with a nonempty agenda set.
Finally, our studies and results basically focused on "single parameterizations," yielding several hardness results. In future studies, in the spirit of multivariate complexity analysis Niedermeier 2010] one may try to extend the range of tractable cases by studying parameter combinations.
